The government told itself that anything you handed to a company — your location, your messages, your searches, your entire digital life — was no longer private, so no warrant was needed. That doctrine turned the Fourth Amendment into a formality in a world where everything passes through somebody’s servers. This statute kills it: the third-party doctrine is abolished, bulk collection is banned, and no one scans your face in public.
Under the third-party doctrine, anything you shared with a company — your location history, your messages, your searches, your financial life — was treated as no longer private. No warrant required.Check it
In a world where every part of life passes through someone else’s servers, that one rule hollowed out the Fourth Amendment entirely.Check it
The government swept up data in bulk, on everyone. The FISA court heard only the government’s side, and its orders ran on indefinitely.Check it
Cameras scanned faces in public spaces. And the courts kept inventing new exceptions to the rule that illegally seized evidence stays out.Check it
The third-party doctrine is abolished for digital information. Handing your data to a company doesn’t hand it to the government — they need a warrant, on a tiered framework.
Bulk domestic collection is prohibited. Surveillance must be targeted, with a genuine foreign-intelligence carve-out that can’t be turned inward.
The FISA court gets an adversary — a National Security Public Advocate — and every order sunsets in a year. Secret courts stop being one-sided.
Biometric surveillance of public spaces is prohibited, with a narrow exception for a specific identified individual. And you can ask, through a citizen portal, whether you were surveilled.
Data held by a company was deemed voluntarily surrendered — so your location, messages, and browsing could be obtained without a warrant.Check it
Abolished for digital information, replaced by a tiered warrant and order framework. Sharing data with a service provider is not consent to hand it to the state.
Programs vacuumed up records on entire populations, innocent people included, and justified it as necessary.Check it
Bulk domestic collection is prohibited outright, with a defined foreign-intelligence standard. Necessary surveillance must be aimed at someone — not at everyone.
The channels between private companies and law enforcement were murky, and data flowed through them with little constraint.Check it
Exactly four permitted sharing scenarios — including a narrow active-emergency scenario carrying an inadmissibility rule, so an emergency can’t be used as a backdoor into a prosecution.
FISA judges heard only the government. Orders could run indefinitely, with no one in the room to argue the other side.Check it
An adversarial process with a National Security Public Advocate, and one-year sunsets on orders. Someone is finally there to say no.
Information gathered under national-security authorities drifted into routine criminal prosecutions.Check it
Intelligence-to-law-enforcement sharing carries use restrictions by prosecution category. Foreign-intelligence powers can’t quietly become a general policing tool.
Biometric systems scanned crowds and tracked people through public space, identifying anyone, anywhere, continuously.Check it
Biometric surveillance of public spaces is prohibited, with a targeted exception for identifying a specific individual. Walking down the street is not consent to be catalogued.
You had essentially no way to learn whether the government had surveilled you — and no institution with the independence to check.Check it
A citizen surveillance portal with a 60-day response, a two-year historical window, and a sunsetting active-investigation exception — plus annual transparency reports and an independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board with real authority.
Exceptions to the exclusionary rule multiplied until an illegal search often carried no consequence at all.Check it
Exclusionary-rule standards are restored: the good-faith exception is bounded and other exceptions are abolished. Break the rules to get evidence, and you lose the evidence.
The government makes you answer the census — by law, under penalty. It promises the answers stay confidential. That promise has been broken: census data was used to find and intern Japanese-American citizens during World War II, and the "confidentiality" law had an emergency loophole big enough to drive the internment through. A promise that breaks the moment the government decides it's urgent was never a promise at all.Check it
Data the government forces you to give — to be counted — can never be turned against you. It may only ever be used as anonymous statistics. There is no consent loophole (you were compelled, so "consent" is meaningless) and — the part that matters most — no emergency, war, or "national security" override. No future law can reach back and unlock data already sealed. An official who misuses it is personally, criminally liable, and anything done to you based on that misuse is void. The promise is finally unbreakable, because it holds hardest exactly when the government most wants to break it.
This is the plain-language version. The binding text is CS-13, which implements Article Twelve and Rights 9 and 10 of the Constitution.
This is your country’s law. Help shape the next draft of it.
